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有息负债率却逐年递增，可见 A 公司 ROE 的增长也并非是由经营性竞争优势带来。
笔者认为 A 公司需从三个方面改革高管薪酬激励制度：第一，公司层面行权条件，




















With the current economy being complicated and the enterprise increasingly fierce 
competition, senior management personnel are the company's core resources, because their 
management decisions directly affect the company's business performance, so it is 
especially critical to their management incentives. Executive compensation incentive is one 
of the most important aspects of the research on the theory and practice. In the separation 
of ownership and management of modern enterprise system, formulate scientific and 
reasonable compensation for examination and assessment system, that is effectively 
motivating executives, reducing principal-agent cost, and improving company performance,  
and increasing enterprise value and shareholder wealth, is the modern company 
management target and the aspirations of each shareholder. However, listed companies 
current commonly used salary incentive measures are not ideal. The incentive effect is not 
big, issues involve that the unreasonable salary incentive mode selects, evaluation method 
is not comprehensive, index of goal setting is not scientific and so on, often makes the 
executive income compensation and corporate performance show that the large deviation, 
the companies operating losses, but executives with “sky-high compensation ”phenomenon. 
Executive compensation incentive is a systematic project, it is a matter of company strategy, 
and cannot be solved by a single point of view. Therefore, it is a realistic work to set up the 
compensation and evaluation incentives.  
This paper discusses the problems of A company's financial performance evaluation 
and executive compensation reform, through the collection and analysis of Vanke, Dong-e-
e-Jiao and Midea companies on performance and executive compensation data and 
information to study its experience and the pros and cons, And improve the executive 
compensation system provides the experience and ideas, the final analysis of A company 
executives pay problems, reform and improve their compensation incentive program. This 
paper is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter 1, overview. Based on listed companies, the current 
situation and problems of executive compensation of listed companies in China are analyzed. 
The executive compensation of listed companies is rising year by year, and the salary growth 
and performance growth of different listed companies show different characteristics. 
Executive pay is growing faster than growth; Executive pay growth is slower than growth; 
the growth of executive compensation and the growth of the performance is stable; 
Executive pay growth and performance growth have no regularity. Through the analysis of 
















principal-agent problem in corporate governance, namely enterprise performance 
evaluation and executive compensation incentive research. Chapter 2, literature review. This 
paper reviews the research results of the relationship between executive compensation and 
corporate performance at home and abroad, and concludes that equity incentive is an 
effective way to solve the problem of principal-agent problem. Chapter 3, the selection of 
three listed companies of different industries. The executive compensation incentive model 
of the implementation of their analysis and comparison, to analyze its characteristics and 
successful experience, illustrates the equity incentive for examination and assessment of the 
compensation incentive model can effectively reduce principal-agent cost, and guard against 
moral hazard, is both can motivate executives’ layer and can improve the performance of 
good corporate governance modes. Chapter 4, taking company A as an example, analysing 
its operating financial situation for nearly five years and points out some deficiencies. To its 
current executive compensation incentive model for analysis, the author thinks that it should 
increase the financial index as equity incentives, such as EVA, ROE. Forming a set of 
relatively scientific and effective incentive plan.Chapter 5, there are the conclusions and 
recommendations of this paper.  
The paper analyzes the current situation of executive compensation of listed companies 
and the problems found, many listed companies pay and company performance growth is 
not synchronized, or pay increases faster than the growth performance, which produce 
executives high salaries, poor company performance; or salary growth slower than the 
growth performance, the company develops very fast, but executives did not get the 
corresponding compensation, is not conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. 
The study further found that salary growth and steady earnings growth ratio of listed 
companies, not only with good performance, and pay attention to salary incentive, which 
promotes the growth performance of the company, to produce a virtuous circle. A common 
characteristic of the listed company is to implement the long-term salary incentive. Through 
the research, the restricted stock incentive plan of A company did not bring about the rapid 
growth of the company's performance, and interest bearing liabilities The rate is increasing 
year by year, visible on the ROE growth is not caused by the operation of competitive 
advantage. The author thinks that the A company from three aspects of the reform of 
executive compensation incentive system: firstly, the company should increase the level of 
exercise conditions, ROE, EVA as a performance assessment index. Secondly, taking the 
















incentives. Thirdly, A company to do strategic performance management, improve the 
scientific implementation of the salary system. 
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2014 年 8 月，腾讯财经媒体公布的一组上市公司高管薪酬数据，再度将“高管天
价薪酬”问题推向舆论的风口浪尖，其中一组数据更是引起广大股民的不满，“2013
年，中海集运亏损超过 26 亿元，但其董事长李绍德拿到了 79 万元年薪。中集集团
2012 年净利润同比大降 47.46%，但其 CEO 麦伯良当年拿到高达 998 万元的薪酬， 
2011 年至 2012 年亏损分别达 104.5 亿元、95.6 亿元的中国远洋，董事长魏家福分别
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（二）中国上市公司近 5 年薪酬现状 
笔者从 CSMAR 数据库筛选出 2012-2016 年中国 A 股上市公司高管（含董事、监
事）薪酬总额数据。剔除金融/保险业且非 ST 总计获得 3256 家上市公司样本数据。
表 1-1 和图 1-1 是总体排名前 3 位、前 5 位和前 10 位上市公司 5 年的高管薪酬总额
数据和折线图。 
 
表 1-1中国上市公司 2012-2016 年高管薪酬总额 
单位： 百万元 
  2012 年 2013 年 2014 年 2015 年 2016 年 
前 3 位高管
薪酬总额 
210.37  163.28  193.97  223.14  286.13  
前 5 位高管
薪酬总额 
302.78  243.94  284.84  347.11  412.95  
前 10 位高管
薪酬总额 
481.59  431.84  491.12  622.18  672.13  
资料来源：根据 CSMAR 国泰安数据库中国 A 股上市公司高管薪酬总额数据整理，2012-2016 
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图 1-1 2012-2016年中国上市公司高管薪酬总额 



















2012年 2013年 2014年 2015年 2016年
前3位高管薪酬总额 210.37 163.28 193.97 223.14 286.13
前5位高管薪酬总额 302.78 243.94 284.84 347.11 412.95
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表 1-2 2012-2016年万科 A高管薪酬与业绩比 
  薪酬/营业收入 薪酬/净利润 薪酬/营业利润 薪酬/经营净现金 薪酬/总资产 
2012 年 0.10% 0.68% 0.50% 2.85% 0.03% 
2013 年 0.05% 0.36% 0.27% 3.45% 0.01% 
2014 年 0.06% 0.45% 0.34% 0.21% 0.02% 
2015 年 0.03% 0.20% 0.16% 0.13% 0.03% 
2016 年 0.03% 0.22% 0.16% 1.10% 0.01% 
资料来源：附录 1 《2012-2016 年薪酬总额前三位上市公司薪酬与财务指标数据》 
  
图 1-2 2012-2016年万科 A高管薪酬与业绩比趋势 
从图 1-2 看出，2012-2016 年期间，万科 A 的薪酬/营业收入、薪酬/净利润、薪
酬/营业利润、薪酬/总资产的比值波动较小，基本保持稳定。说明万科 A 的高管薪酬
增长与业绩增长基本保持稳定比例。其中薪酬/经营净现金在 2013 年达到最大值后
迅速下降，在 2016 年开始增长，5 年内波动较大。 
表 1-3 2012-2016年中集集团高管薪酬与业绩比 
  薪酬/营业收入 薪酬/净利润 薪酬/营业利润 薪酬/经营净现金 薪酬/总资产 
2012 年 0.07% 1.84% 1.35% 1.58% 0.06% 
2013 年 0.08% 2.13% 1.56% 1.82% 0.20% 
2014 年 0.07% 1.97% 1.44% 1.69% 0.17% 
2015 年 0.07% 1.75% 1.35% -1.10% 0.04% 































资料来源：附录 1 《2012-2016 年薪酬总额前三位上市公司薪酬与财务指标数据》 
  
图 1-3 2012-2016年中集集团高管薪酬与业绩比 
  
图 1-3 表明 2012-2016 年期间，中集集团薪酬/营业收入、薪酬/净利润、薪酬/营
业利润、薪酬/总资产比值总体呈上升趋势。说明中集集团的薪酬增长速度要快于业
绩的增长速度。中集集团的经营净现金在 2015 年和 2016 年是负值。 
 
表 1-4 2012-2016年泛海控股高管薪酬与业绩比 
  薪酬/营业收入 薪酬/净利润 薪酬/营业利润 薪酬/经营净现金 薪酬/总资产 
2012 年 0.27% 1.57% 1.27% 0.56% 0.04% 
2013 年 0.39% 1.96% 1.48% 0.59% 0.06% 
2014 年 0.41% 1.49% 1.09% -0.63% 0.03% 
2015 年 0.69% 2.44% 1.81% -2.74% 0.05% 
2016 年 0.76% 4.65% 3.94% 4.15% 0.20% 
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